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• We present a case study of information security management in a Chinese 
hospital. 
• We focus on the organisational strategies of response to regulative pressures. 
• The determinants are governmental enforcement and organisational 
self-awareness.  
• A framework of organisational responses to regulative pressures is developed. 
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This paper advances existing theoretical understanding of the factors impacting upon 
organisational responses to regulative pressures in the process of information security 
management (ISM). Drawing on institutional theory, we conduct acase study of ISM 
in a Chinese hospital. A theoretical framework is presented, which proposes that 
organisational response strategies devised in response to regulative pressures are 
determined jointly by internal organisational incentives and external government 
supervision and enforcement. Practical implications for policymakers to promote organisational 
ISM are given and suggestions for future research based on the theoretical findings of the 
case study are provided.  
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Recent decades have witnessed the broad application of information systems in 
society. The introduction of information systems presents security challenges, with 
myriad examples of information security failures causing significant financial losses 
and potential damage to the reputation of the organisations concerned (Norton, 2012). 
For example, in April 2011, the Sony PlayStation Network faced a series of hack 
attacks on three of its gaming systems, resulting in the theft of confidential 
information of over 77 million customers, including unencrypted bank accounts, 
purchase histories, passwords and billing addresses. This incident resulted in Sony 
suffering an estimated loss of $20 million in revenue, as a result of a two-week 
service breakdown; and$32 billion loss was incurred as a result of losing control of 
customer data (Mawani, 2011). Sony was also castigated for putting the personal and 
financial data of numerous customers at risk, with Sony UK fined $395,000 by the 
UK Information Commissioner for the breach of Data Protection Act (BBC, 2013). In 
the healthcare sector, which is the focus of this article information security is the most 
critical issue in the operation of information systems, as the data that is stored and 
processed is particularly sensitive (Masrom and Rahimly, 2015). It is clear that if 
sensitive medical information, such as mental health history; is accessed by 
unauthorised users, the subsequent infringement of patient privacy could have serious 
consequences for the individual concerned (Win, 2005). Healthcare providers 
therefore have a duty to maintain the confidentiality of patients’ data, and failing to do 
so may incur expensive fines and lawsuits. For example, in July 2013, the health 
company WellPoint was fined $1.7 million by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services for allowing the medical and other personal information of hundreds 
and thousands of people to be publicly accessible via the Internet. Additional recovery 
actions, such as legal actions, new security control investments, extended credit 
protection services for victims and other related costs, pushed the cost to 
approximately $142 million (Filkins, 2014); while in March 2014, Stanford Hospital 
and Clinics, based in California, USA, was fined $4 million for allowing 20,000 
patient records to be accessed via the Internet (Green, 2015). 
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Evidence to date has shown that the majority of failures in information security, 
especially in the healthcare sector (Masrom and Rahimly, 2015), arise as a result of 
human and organisational factors (Chang and Ho, 2006). A range of issues, including 
poor management (Wood, 1995), ignorance on behalf of top and middle management 
(Straub and Welke, 1998), employees’ misuse of information systems (Siponen, 
2000), a failure to comply with information security policy (Stanton et al., 2005), and 
the lack of an organisational information security strategy (Bakari et al., 2007) have 
each been shown to directly or indirectly precipitate information security failures. In 
response, information security management (ISM) offers procedures and standards to 
protect information systems from unauthorised accessand protect information from 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction (Cazemier et al., 2000). As early 
as in 2008, Spagnoletti and Resca called for the urgent introduction of efficient ISM 
in organisations, asserting that information security failures cannot be solved solely 
by applying mechanisms such as firewalls and anti-virus software. Furthermore, it is 
clear that information security is not only an issue of individual and organisational 
behaviours, but is also a matter for governments and regulative bodies. Existing 
studies highlight that the political power utilised by governments (Smith, Winchester 
and Bunker, 2010), coupled with regulative pressures (Hsu, Lee and Straub, 2012) 
impact upon organisational decision-making in regard to ISM activities. In terms of 
institutional theory (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2001), government authorities often exert 
regulative pressures on organisations in relation to their ISM functions, and 
organisations are required to comply with such pressures. This case study focuses on 
the organisational responses arising from the regulative pressures on ISM.  
 
In accordance with institutional theory, organisations may not always meet 
governmental demands and fully comply with the regulative pressures (Oliver, 1991). 
The failure to adhere to regulative demands is found to be a major factor in 
information security failure (Hsu, Lee and Straub, 2012; Stanton et al., 2005), although 
existing research to date emphasises compliance (Ransbotham and Mitra, 2009; Safar and 
Clark, 2009). Adding to the extant knowledge on the role of government in 
organisational ISM, this paper considers levels of organisational conformity, ranging 
from full compliance to the non-compliance behaviours of organisations. Our research 
question is: How do organisations respond to regulative pressures on ISM and why?  
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Bjorck (2004) highlights that institutional theory offers a means to explain 
organisational behaviours in response to the regulative pressures of ISM. Adopting an 
institutional perspective, we answer the research question through the use of a case 
study of a Chinese public hospital. To date, the majority of research into ISM has 
been conducted in the context of developed countries. However, developing countries 
are playing an increasingly important role in information security, and hence present 
an interesting research focus for ISM scholars. Furthermore, information security in 
developing countries is faced with severe challenges due to their poor legal 
infrastructure and weak legal systems (Gao, 2005; Luo, 2003; Yildirim et al., 2011), 
with calls for improved theoretical guidance on their ISM practices (Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, 2007). Due to the scale of its adoption of 
information systems, China is an excellent area for research, as it is prone to 
tremendous threats to its information security. In recent years, the Chinese 
government has made important efforts in providing a secure environment for the 
operation of its information systems, highlighting effective ISM as one of the most 
critical issues in its initiative of national informatisation (State Council, 2006); taking 
a number of steps to ensure that ISM is prioritised, especially in the public sector. 
Informatisation is the production and use of ICT hardware, software, and services 
(Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). However, despite this, ISM in China still lags far 
behind that of developed countries. In 2012, a survey revealed that in most Chinese 
organisations, information security protection did not meet business requirements, and 
that government intervention in organisational ISM was ineffective (PWC, 2012).  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the ISM 
literature, focusing on ISM research from an institutional perspective. In Section 3, 
we define ISM processes, introduce the concepts of institutional pressures and 
organisational response strategies, and develop our analytical framework for the case 
study. In Section 4, we present the research design and research method. Sections 5 
details the case study. In the final sections, we outline the theoretical findings and 
draw practical implications from the case study, and discuss the research limitations 
and possible future research directions.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
Information security is the term used to describe the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information (Bishop, 2003). In recent years there has been recognition 
of the limited reliability of technologies such as firewalls and anti-virus software to 
protect information security, leading to a growing emphasis on ISM (Choobineh et al., 
2007; Siponen, 2000). ISM provides an organisational management approach to the 
prevention of malicious information security breaches, designed to ensure the 
provision of an acceptable level of information confidentiality (von Solms, 1996).  
 
ISM aims to offer “the development of a security management programme including 
the security policy, management committee, team structure, risk management, and 
employee education to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information in organisations” (Hsu, Lee and Straub, 2012; p.3). Given its importance, 
we would argue that ISM is relevant to every part of an organisation, and is 
influenced by panoply of external actors, including governments (ISO/IEC, 2005). 
Despite this, the majority of the ISM literature currently considers the individual level, 
for example, considering employees’ misuse of information systems (Hovav and 
D’Arcy, 2012), and failure to comply with information security rules (Guo et al., 2011; 
Johnston and Warkentin, 2010).  
 
Kraemer, Carayon and Clem (2009) point to the need for a deeper understanding of 
organisational behaviours in ISM in a specific institutional context. In response, this 
paper focuses on the organisational level of ISM, which is largely ignored in the 
literature. In the limited extant research on organisational ISM, institutional theory offers 
a unique view of the rational and irrational behaviours of organisations in reaction to 
regulative rules (Bjorck, 2004). However, the current institutional research on organisational 
ISM has two key weaknesses. Firstly, ISM is a process consisting of a set of control activities 
concerning the management of people, policies, projects, programmes, technology facilities, and 
resources (Cazemier, Overbeek and Peters, 2000; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Due to the 
complexity of the ISM process, previous research has focused on specific stages and particular 
aspects of ISM, failing to provide a comprehensive perspective. For example, 
Backhouse, Hsu and Silva (2006) find that a rising concern over information security 
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breaches has triggered the initiative of developing information security standards, 
which shape the configuration of information systems and influence how information 
systems are used and managed. Hu, Hart and Cooke (2007) demonstrate how 
institutional forces shape the process of ISM system implementation in organisations; 
and Hsu, Lee and Straub (2012) emphasise the influence of institutional pressures on 
the adoption and assimilation of new ISM methods.  
 
Secondly, existing research largely focuses on the compliance phenomenon and the 
acquiescence strategy of organisations. For example, Smith, Winchester and Bunker 
(2010) argue for an information security standard devised as an institution established 
by government and requiring obligatory compliance by organisations. Hu, Hart and 
Cooke (2007) analyse the mandatory compliance to a single regulative pressure: the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), in the ISM system implementation stage; with both 
largely ignoring the fact that in reality organisations may challenge existing 
institutional requirements and use response strategies other than acquiescence (Silva 
and Backhouse, 2003); including compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation, 
as suggested by Oliver (1991). Overall, the literature lacks a holistic view of the 
interactions that occur between organisations and the regulative environment in the 
ISM process. 
 
In this paper we draw upon institutional theory to conduct a case study of the whole 
ISM process, considering how an organisation responds using a mix of different 
strategies, each presenting varying levels of conformity to regulative pressures. 
Institutional theory allows us to analyse the interaction of organisations with external 
social structures (Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1983), providing a lens to explain how 
organisations respond to the regulative effects demanded by government on their ISM 
strategies. Organisations in developing and emerging economies, where the legal 
systems often do not function efficiently, are more likely to challenge or ignore 
government demands on ISM than those in developed countries (Yildirim et al., 2011). 
With this in mind, and with a paucity of similar research, China provides a suitable 
research setting for us to consider the determinants of different levels of 
organisational conformity to regulative pressures, while also addressing the urgent 
need for ISM research in developing and emerging economies. In 2011, the Norton 
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Global Information Security Survey claimed that the worldwide financial losses that 
year directly attributable to information security breaches amounted to some $114 
billion, with almost half ($46 billion) occurring in China. That same year, India and 
Brazil lost around $16 billion in total, and Europe lost approximately $16 billion 
(Norton, 2012). In our review of 24 leading journals relevant to ISM, we found only 
two articles that investigated ISM in emerging economies, and therefore it is clear that 
research on ISM in China is of timely and significant academic and practical interest.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
 
3.1. The ISM Process  
 
The ISM process consists of five stages: strategy formation and goal setting for 
information security, information security policy (ISP) making, information security 
awareness (ISA) training, implementation of security mechanisms and policies, and 
the evaluation, monitoring and improvement of the process (ISO/IEC, 2005). An ISM 
initiative starts when an information security strategy is devised supported by a set of 
information security protection goals, which should align with the wider business 
strategy of the organisation (Hsu, 2009). ISP provides direction and support to 
organisational ISM (Knapp et al., 2009), while ISA training aims to educate 
organisational employees to comply with ISP in their everyday use of information 
systems (Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; Straub and Welke, 1998). When an ISP is 
enforced effectively, influenced by organisational, environmental, and behavioural 
factors (Herath and Rao, 2009), an information security system will be implemented 
to protect digital assets from the threat posed by various technological or human 
forces. Information security monitoring is responsible for tracking the security status 
and detecting potential breaches in information security, while the term information 
security evaluation refers to the internal and external audits carried out to determine 
security performance. The results of such evaluations provide the basis for 
information security managers to monitor an organisation’s security status and take 




3.2. Institutional Pressures and Organisational Responses 
 
Institutional theory asserts that organisations inhabit an institutional environment 
comprised of three pillars: cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative institutions 
(Scott, 2001). The cultural-cognitive institutional pillar emphasises the influence of 
culture as the context that shapes cognition. The normative pillar is based on agents’ 
social obligations, which are observable through values and norms, while normative 
rules define the actors’ behaviour through “prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory” 
values and norms (Scott, 2001, p. 54). The regulative pillar addresses how actors’ 
behaviours are constrained and regulated under coercion by rules and laws and the 
fear of sanctions. In summary, Scott proposes that institutional pressures are 
comprised of control mechanisms exerted by cultural-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures (institutions) each designed to constrain actors’ behaviour 
(Gosain, 2004; Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). 
 
In this paper we focus on one of Scott’s (2001) three pillars, the impact of regulative 
institutions situated in a specific legal environment. A review of the literature reveals 
that there are two kinds of regulative pressures that are particularly relevant to ISM in 
Chinese organisations. One area of regulative pressure is laws and regulations, which 
describe the set of rules instituted by government or other legislative authorities that 
seek to constrain the behaviour of organisations and individuals. Chinese 
organisations are subject to different levels of laws and regulations (Gao, 2005; Luo, 
2003). In the healthcare sector, at a national level, the National People’s Congress 
issued the Criminal Law on February 28th, 2009; while at an industry level, the 
Ministry of Health issued the Decree No. 66 - Administrative Measures for Internet 
Medical and Health Information Services, on July 1st, 2009. In addition, each 
province devises its own information security regulations for local healthcare 
organisations. Information security standards are technical regulations that 
organisations are required to comply with. In September 1999, the Ministry of Public 
Security issued GB 17859-1999, the Computer Information Systems Security 
Protection Classification regarded as the most important national information security 
standard (GB is the acronym of Guojia Biaozhun, which in Chinese means national 
standard). It offers a set of terminologies for ISM system design, implementation and 
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evaluation for every Chinese organisation. Another important standard, GB/T 
19716-2005, the Code of Practice for Information Security Management (later 
replaced by GB/T 22081-2008) issued by State Bureau of Quality Technical 
Supervision and the Standardisation Administration in October 2005. It provides 
national guidelines for ISM practice. In addition, hospitals are required to comply 
with all relevant local standards issued by their local government. 
 
Another area of regulative pressure is national policy, which provides advisory 
legislation, guidelines and codes of practice for organisations (Ku, Chang and Yen, 
2009; Sundt, 2006). On March 16th, 2006 the Chinese State Council promulgated the 
National Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), which called on all organisations to 
address their ISM and strengthen their information security infrastructure. On May 8th, 
2006 the State Council issued the National Informatics Development Strategy 
(2006-2020), calling on organisations to devise ISPs and improve their ISM.   
 
Oliver (1991) identifies five organisational strategies in response to institutional 
pressures, as illustrated in Table 1. In order of level of conformity to institutional 
pressures, these strategies are acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and 
manipulation. The acquiescence strategy implies full conformity, and the actions of an 
organisation employing an acquiescence strategy may include habitation, taking 
institutional requirements for granted; or imitation, where other organisations are 
consciously or unconsciously mimicked, or suggestions from industry experts are 


















Table 1 Organisational Response Strategy to Institutional Pressures 
Strategies Tactics Examples 
Acquiesce Habit Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms 
 Imitate Mimicking institutional models 
 Comply Obeying rules and accepting norms 
Compromise Balance Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
 Pacify Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
 Bargain Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
Avoidance Conceal Disguising nonconformity 
 Buffer Loosening institutional attachments 
 Escape Changing goals, activities, or domains 
Defiance Dismiss Ignoring explicit norms and values 
 Challenge Contesting rules and requirements 
 Attack Assaulting the sources of institutional pressures 
Manipulation Co-opt Importing influential constituents 
 Influence Shaping values and criteria 
 Control Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
Source: adopted from Oliver (1991); cited in Modell (2001) 
 
 
To adopt compromise and avoidance strategies illustrates a moderate level of 
conformity to institutional pressures. Specifically, to adopt a compromise strategy is 
to try to “balance, pacify or bargain with” external pressures (Oliver, 1991; p. 153). 
To balance external pressures requires organisations to partially meet institutional 
expectations, to pacify means organisations intend to achieve the minimum 
institutional expectations; while to bargain requires organisations to negotiate with an 
institutional entity regarding its expectations. When adopting an avoidance strategy, 
an organisation appears to comply with institutional rules but in fact tries to “reduce 
and escape” them (Oliver, 1991; p. 154). In this instance, organisations do not 
actually comply with institutional rules, but rather attempt to show ‘symbolised’ 
acceptance of institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Organisations may 
design an action plan in response to institutional pressures but not implement it; may 
decouple institutional attachments to minimise external inspection; or change 
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organisational goals and activities in order to escape the rules imposed by external 
entities (Modell, 2001).  
 
The defiance and manipulation strategies outlined in Table 1 are nonconformity 
responses, where organisations deliberately resist institutional rules. When defiance 
occurs, an organisation ignores or even challenges institutional rules, while 
manipulation involves co-opting, influencing or controlling institutional expectations 
to align with organisational interests. By co-opting the source of the pressure, for 
example by persuading an institutional constituent to join the organisation, the 
organisation seeks to neutralise institutional opposition and enhance its legitimacy. By 
influencing institutional rules, an organisation shapes the design of institutional norms, 
values and expectations; and by controlling such rules; organisations establish power 




3.3. Analytical Framework 
 
Our research considers the organisational responses to the regulative pressures present 
in the ISM process. Based on the review of the literature, our analytical framework is 
illustrated at Figure 1. The ISM process consists of a number of stages and activities, 
including the formation of an information security strategy and security goal setting, 
ISP making, ISA training, the implementation of security techniques, and the 
evaluation and improvement of the adopted strategy (ISO/IEC, 2005). During the ISM 
process, an organisation encounters regulative pressures in the shape of laws, 
regulations and national policies. At this point, organisations respond with the 
strategies of acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation (Oliver, 
1991).  
 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) propose to understand social interactions between 
organisations and their environment by considering both the internal rationale for and 
the external constraints on the interactions, and therefore we link internal incentives 
and the external enforcement of the pressures to organisational response strategies. 
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Ma, Schmidt and Pearson (2009) posit that an organisation has incentives to comply 
with the regulative pressures deemed to fit within its business objectives; an 
organisation may choose to adopt a modest level of conformity or nonconformity to a 
regulative pressure when it conflicts with the business objectives of the organisation 
(Oliver, 1991). Furthermore, Hechter, Opp and Wippler (1990) argue that an 
organisation decides how to respond to a particular regulative pressure by balancing 
the associated rewards and penalties for abiding by or breaking it. Thus it is argued 
that organisations may selectively comply with regulatory pressures as balanced 
against the strength of enforcement of the rules by regulators, and therefore an 
organisation may choose to not fully comply with regulatory pressures that are 




Figure 1 Analytical Framework: 




(Law, Regulation, National Policy) 
Organisational incentives Government legal enforcement 
Organisational responses: 
acquiescence, compromise,  
















4.  Research Methods 
 
As the research framework outlined in Figure 1 shows, our aim is to explore the 
impact of internal incentives for compliance and the external enforcement of regulative 
pressures on organisational response strategy. In doing so, we adopt an in-depth case study 
method, which is widely viewed as appropriate for addressing “how” and “why” 
questions (Yin, 2008); and is particularly suited to our objective to understand how 
and why organisations respond to regulative pressures in the ISM process. The focus 
of our case is Dynasty Hospital (a pseudonym), a public hospital in China. In China, 
government actors are afforded direct control over public organisations (Gao, 2005; 
Luo, 2003), meaning that government intervention in ISM may be greater than in the 
private sector, and thus the sector would be expected to be more compliant to 
government pressures in relation to ISM, and therefore should be better equipped than 
private sector organisations to comply with regulative requirements regarding ISM. 
Our case study of a public hospital can improve understanding about the challenges 
that the governments face when promoting ISM in a developing country context, 
allowing us to draw important theoretical insights and provide likely implications on 
ISM. 
 
The analytical framework at Figure 1 provides the ‘sensitising theory’ to guide the 
collection and analysis of data (Klein and Myers, 1999). Furthermore, the, framework 
adheres to the basic elements of case study research design as outlined by Yin (2008), 
providing as it does the research question, the unit of analysis, the requirements for 
the data, and the rules of analysis. Specifically, our research unit of analysis is the 
organisational response strategies to regulative pressures moderated by organisational 
incentives and regulative enforcement. Following this framework, in the data 
collection stage we have delineated the process line of ISM in Dynasty Hospital into 
five stages, and identified the key milestones and critical activities at each stage. We 
have also collected data on regulative pressures, be they laws, government regulations 
or national policies; the response strategies of the case organisation; and other 
relevant internal and external factors impacting upon organisational ISM behaviours.  
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To ensure we achieved a holistic view, we collected data from different sources 
(Markus et al., 2006). The websites and archives of Dynasty Hospital and relevant 
authorities were useful to obtain background information and the ISM history of the 
hospital, and to identify the regulative pressures on ISM in China, particularly those 
impacting upon Dynasty Hospital. During March 2011 and February 2012, we visited 
the case organisation on four separate occasions, each time for between two and four 
weeks (see Table 2). During these fieldtrips, we made direct observations. For 
example, in April 2011, we were in the research setting for one month, spending some 
4-6 hours each day observing the common information security problems that 
emerged in different departments, and the solutions offered by the Information Centre 
to overcome them. In each visit to the hospital we also conducted semi-structured 
interviews, each being held in a private environment and lasting for approximately 
one hour. After each round of interviews, we maintained contact with our informants 
by email and telephone in order to clarify our understanding of regulative pressures 
and organisational responses during the data analysis phase. All interview data was 
recorded, translated into English and transcribed. When selecting interviewees, we 
identified actors that were knowledgeable about ISM practices and their context, and 
who were representative of the key ISM stakeholders in the case hospital. The 
interviewees include administrative staff, doctors and nurses in their role as end-users: 
as well as ISP makers, security implementation and maintenance engineers, and 
information systems managers. These interviewees were also demographically 
representative of the employee population of the hospital. Specifically, our 
interviewees from the case hospital included 12 males and 7 females, aged from their 
mid 20s (one nurse) to their early 60s (one doctor), with the majority aged between 
mid- 30s to late 40s. The interviewees’ length of employment varied from five to 32 
years. In terms of education level, one nurse had a college diploma, the Chief 
Information Systems Officer and two doctors held PhD degrees, and the other 
participants held bachelor or masters degrees. Outside the hospital, we interviewed 
two technicians from an information security product contractor, who were able to 
provide information on the ISM system in the case hospital as well as more general 
information security techniques. To aid our understanding of the policy context 
surrounding ISM, we also interviewed one officer from the local Shannxi Provincial 
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Health Bureau in charge of information security regulation, and two Chief 
Information Systems Officers in other two hospitals located in the same province. 
 
Table 2: Interview Arrangements 
Time period Topics covered Informants 





• History of ISM development  
• Perceptions of ISM 
• ISM status in healthcare 
sector 
• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• 2 Technicians from an information 
security product contractor 
• Head, Software Centre 
• Head, Hardware Centre 





• Regulative forces in China’s 
healthcare sector 
• Examples of ISM failure 
• Healthcare informatisation 
and the ISM development process 
• Organisational response to 
regulative forces 
• Perceptions of ISM from 
middle and senior management 
• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director, Information Centre 
• 1 Administrator, Development 
Division 
• Vice Head, Information Steering 
Committee 
• Head, Software Centre 
• Head, Hardware Centre 
• Head, Database Centre 
• 2 Technicians from an information 
security product contractor  
• Officer, Public Health Department, 
local Provincial Health Bureau 
• 2 Chief Information Systems 






• ISP and information security 
/ ISM regulations 
• External and internal 
influences 
• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director, Information Centre 
• 1 Administrator, Development 
Division 






• Employees’ perception of 
information security 
• Employees’ security 
behaviour 
• ISA training and education 
• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• 2 Doctors, Clinical Registration 
Office 
• 1 Doctor and 3 Nurses, Inpatient 
Registration Office 
• 3 Doctors, Clinic Department 
• 3 Doctors, Inpatient Department 
 
The objective of data analysis is to understand organisational response strategies to 
regulative pressures in different stages of the ISM process. Using the analytical 
framework outlined in Figure 1, we have developed our understanding regarding the 
choices made by Dynasty Hospital of response strategies by exploring the relevant 
internal reasons (incentives) and external contextual factors (enforcement) (Strauss 
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and Corbin, 1990). Data regarding ISM processes, organisational response strategies 
and organisational incentive and regulative enforcement factors were coded 
chronologically and by ISM stage in the transcripts, and analysed in two steps. In the 
first step, we investigated key information security incidents, regulative pressures and 
the organisational responses in each ISM stage that occurred between 2001 and 2012. 
In the second step, we categorised the internal incentives to comply with ISM, along 
with the external enforcement of regulative pressures that impacted upon the 
organisational response at different stages of the ISM process. In an attempt to avoid 
bias; data triangulation and investigator triangulation were conducted (Yin, 2008). 
The results of data triangulation are shown in Table 3. Data were interpreted, refined 
and tested along with the research, and discussion meetings were held among the 
authors from China and Europe, each of who are experts in information systems in 




















Table 3: Data Collection and Triangulation 
Data Data collection 
methods 
Date Source 1 (interviews) Data Source 2 
(documents) 







• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director of Information Centre 
• Administrator in Development Division  
• Vice Head, Information Steering Committee  
• Heads of Software Centre, Hardware Centre, Database Centre 
• An Officer, local Provincial Health Bureau 
















• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director of Information Centre 
• Administrator in Development Division  
• Vice Head, Information Steering Committee 
• Heads of Software Centre, Hardware Centre, Database Centre 
Hospital documents 
(organisational 
policies, roles, and 
responsibilities of the 
hospital) 
4 informatisation 
development meetings; 2 
information systems 
evaluation meetings; 4 
weeks of daily 







• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director of Information Centre 
• Administrator in Development Division  
• Heads of Software Centre, Hardware Centre, Database Centre 
• 2 Technicians from an information security contractor 
• 9 Doctors in different departments 





development meetings; 4 
weeks of daily 
observations (9am- 5pm) 
(April 2011); 3 weeks of 
daily observations (9am-








• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director of Information Centre 











• Chief Information Systems Officer 
• Director of Information Centre 
• Administrator in Development Division  
• Vice Head, Information Steering Committee 
• Officer, local Provincial Health Bureau 
• 2 Chief Information Systems Officers at 2 local hospitals 
 4 informatisation 
development meetings; 2 
information systems 
evaluation meetings; 2 
weeks of daily 







5. The Case Study: Regulative Pressures on ISM and the Responses of Dynasty 
Hospital 
 
State-owned Dynasty Hospital is a leading medical research centre and healthcare facility in 
Xi’an, the capital city of Shannxi Province located in the west of China. It has 16 functional 
departments consisting of 67 divisions, and employs some 1200 staff. The Information Centre 
is responsible for information systems operation and ISM. This centre is comprised of five 
divisions: the Network Centre, the Software Centre, the Hardware Centre, the Database 
Centre and the Patients Case Centre. Dynasty Hospital began a programme in mid 2001 to 
deploy information systems throughout the hospital and to use information systems in its 
business operations. The first stage of this work was finished in mid 2003, when the hospital 
established its clinical information systems but did not implement information security 
mechanisms. By the end of 2005, the IS infrastructure was established and the hospital had 
constructed its own Intranet. As information systems were rolled out and used in everyday 
tasks, information security incidents began to emerge and the hospital started to focus on 
information security protection and pay attention to ISM. In this section, we apply the 
analytical framework introduced at Figure 1 to investigate each stage of the ISM process at 
Dynasty Hospital. Specifically, we present Dynasty Hospital’s selection of response strategies 
by examining their internal rationale and external regulative pressures. The results are 











Table 4: Organisational Responses to Regulative Pressures on ISM in Dynasty Hospital 
ISM Process Regulative Pressures  Organisational Responses  
Strategy formation 
and goal setting 
• Regulations: 
Decree No. 27, 136, 147; 
National Standard GB 17859-1999 
• National Policy:  
National Healthcare Informatisation 
Policy 2003-2010; National 
Informatisation Strategy 2006-2020 
Defiance at the outset when there is no 
government inspection; followed by 
acquiescence when government inspection 
is scheduled. Originally deemed as being of 
low interests to the organisation. 
Policy making • Laws and Regulations: 
Criminal Law 
National Standards GB 17859-1999, 
GB 4943-1995, GB 9361-88 
• National Policies: 
National Healthcare; Informatisation 
Policy 2003-2010; National 





Defiance. Deemed as not offering clear 
information regarding what should be 
considered when designing the ISP 
Awareness training • Regulations: 
Decree No. 27, 136 
National Standards GB 17859-1999, 
GB/T 20269-2006 
• National Policy:  
National Healthcare Informatisation 
Policy 2003-2010; National 
Informatisation Strategy 2006-2020  
Avoidance at the outset. Deemed as not 
useful to the organisation.  
Acquiescence after security incidents 
occurred. Then viewed as of high interest to 
the organisation 
Strict enforcement by government 
Implementation • Laws and Regulations: 
Decree No. 51, 136, 147 
National Standards GB 17859-
1999, GB/T 20270-2006, GB/T 
20273-2006, GB/T 20272-2006, 
GB/T 20281-2006; 
• National Policies: 
National Healthcare; 
Informatisation Policy 2003-
2010; National Informatisation 
Strategy 2006-2020 
Acquiescence with or without the 
government enforcement 




• Laws and Regulations: 
Decree No. 27, 66, 136, 147 
National Standard GB 17859-1999 
• National Policy: 
National Healthcare 
Informatisation Policy 2003-
2010; National Informatisation 
Strategy 2006-2020  
Defiance at the outset, when no government 
inspection, and acquiescence once 
inspection was scheduled  
Initially viewed as being of low interests, 









5.1.  Strategy formation and goal setting 
 
The information security strategy of an organisation represents its plan for information 
security goals, policies and actions (Beebe and Rao, 2010). Information security goals 
establish what an organisation should expect to achieve when protecting information security 
in any given time period (ISO/IEC, 2005). As discussed in Section 1, the government and 
regulatory authorities in China have introduced a number of laws and regulations regarding 
information security over the past two decades. All have urged public organisations including 
hospitals to devise an information security strategy and to set clear information security 
protection goals and objectives. However, according to the Chief Information Systems 
Officer at Dynasty Hospital, at the time this legislation was being introduced, the hospital’s 
top priority was building their information systems infrastructure and ensuring that it would 
function efficiently. As a consequence, the hospital chose to adopt a defiance strategy in 
response to these national policies and regulations.  
 
This changed when the local Provincial Health Bureau released Decree No. 136 on 
September 8th, 2008. This decree set the criteria for healthcare informatisation for hospitals in 
this province, which contained a requirement for hospitals to devise an information security 
strategy. Crucially, the Provincial Health Bureau established a timetable for field inspections 
in every hospital to check their compliance with this regulative pressure. As suggested by 
Hechter, Opp and Wippler (1990), such a measure of government supervision would prove 
effective, as it included direct consequences for reward or punishment. At this point, Dynasty 







We chose to comply closely with the government supervision and have our 
information security strategy and goals in writing, as we do not want to be 
set as the bad example in ISM for peer hospitals, which would damage our 
reputation. 
 
From late 2008, Dynasty Hospital introduced ISM as an important part of its information 
systems operation, with senior management emphasising the importance of information 
security strategy design. At this point, the hospital devised a five-year programme to meet its 
ongoing information security goals, which according to the Director of the Information 
Centre were mainly based on State Council Decree No. 147 issued in February 1994, 
Regulation on Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems. Following Article 3 of 
this decree, Dynasty Hospital defined its information security goals as being 
 
to enforce the safety of information systems and the operation, the safety of computer 
and its complementary sets of equipment, facilities and network, the safety of 
operating environment, and the safety of patient and hospital information; to 
safeguard the normal performance of information systems functions.  
 
 
5.2 Policy Making 
 
As discussed above, ISP provides the ISM direction for an organisation and defines the 
positive and negative behaviours of information systems usage. ISP is regarded as an 
important part of ISM in the healthcare sector (Stahl, Doherty and Shaw, 2012). An effective 
ISP is characterised by its breadth, clarity and brevity in contents (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 
2010), although ISP making is often restricted by an organisation’s information security 
strategy and goals; and therefore when this security strategy and goals change, the ISP must 
be modified accordingly (ISO/IEC, 2005). However, in the case of Dynasty Hospital, the 






late 2007, whilst the strategy and goals were incomplete. According to the Director of the 
Information Centre, this was done with the aim of normalising employee behaviour when 
using information systems in order to prevent breaches in information security. At the same 
time, and following the work of Karyda, Kiountouzis and Kokolakis (2005), the Chinese 
government exerted control over the organisation’s ISP by enacting laws and regulations but 
without imposing any associated enforcement measures. In designing their ISP, Dynasty 
Hospital deliberately adopted only those parts of the regulations that it believed useful for 
guiding their ISM practice. For example, Dynasty Hospital adopted a compromise strategy to 
the Criminal Law. Article No. 286, which stipulates that “any person who deletes, amends, 
adds or disturbs functions and causes the malfunctions of a computer information system 
shall be sentenced fixed-term imprisonment”. Correspondingly, the Dynasty Hospital’s ISP 
states “anyone violating the Criminal Law, Article No. 286, should be recorded a demerit 
conduct, or dismissed from job, or be prosecuted if the consequence is serious”, while other 
parts of the law were ignored.  
 
It is therefore clear that Dynasty Hospital intended to adopt only selected security standards 
for its ISP. For example, the hospital took a defiance strategy to national security standard 
(GB 17859-1999) on information security classification. According to the Head of the 
Software Centre, this standard was not of benefit to the hospital when formulating its ISP, as 
it was perceived as too complex to follow and did not offer specific guidance for ISP making. 
In contrast, Dynasty Hospital included standards GB 4943-1995 - Safety Requirements for 
Information Techniques Facilities, and GB 9361-88 - Safety Requirements for Computer 
Centre Field into its ISP, as these standards were concerned with physical security issues, 
which were useful to the hospital when constructing its information infrastructure, and 







National information security policies provide guidance for organisations when developing 
policies (Knapp et al., 2009). Specifically, the National Healthcare Informatisation Policy 
2003-2010 and National Informatisation Strategy 2006-2020 defined the targeted macro 
environment of information security in the required period, which were not considered when 
Dynasty Hospital designed its ISP. The Director of the Information Centre explained its 
defiance strategy to us as follows: “we need something solid to help us design the specific 




5.3. ISA Training 
 
ISA aims to widen the understanding of the importance of information security and the 
recognition of potential information security risks by both organisations and individuals 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010). ISA also includes ISP awareness, as an 
organisation’s ISP will only be effective if the individuals working within an organisation are 
aware of and comply with it (Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010). ISA training can improve users’ 
awareness of and further compliance to ISP, andensure ISM effectiveness (Straub and 
Welke, 1998; Tsohou et al., 2010). However, Chinese information security laws and 
regulations rarely mention ISA, although the National Healthcare Informatisation Policy 
2003-2010 highlighted that hospitals should pay attention to ISA training in order to improve 
individuals’ basic information security knowledge and skills. Furthermore, in Decree No. 136, 
the local Provincial Health Bureau specified the time and scope of ISA training for relevant 






this in mind, Dynasty Hospital initiated its ISA training programme in March 2009, six 
months before the scheduled inspection, although the hospital showed only a symbolic 
acceptance of institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and ‘disguising 
nonconformity’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 154). In terms of institutional theory as outlined in Table 1, 
Dynasty Hospital took an avoidance strategy. The Chief Information Systems Officer 
explained to us: 
 
We realised ISA training was useful to prevent security breaches by our 
employees who lacked knowledge of information security and information 
systems usage. This issue was that these regulations and rules did not specify how 
to do the training. We were not ready to organise such kind of trainings at that 
time. But we had to show the government we have done something. We have only 
organised several simple lectures to the end-users. Our curriculums were tailored 
to this group of trainees, almost entirely on technologies like virus software usage, 
firewall protections and physical layer security. Most of the people coming to the 
training were from our centre. Our doctors, nurses and administrators told us they 
were too busy with routine medical care to spare time for attending the trainings. 
Top-level managers were not involved in the training programme, though they 
should be core training subjects for their medical background lacking basic 
knowledge on information systems and information security.  
 
Consequently, the training introduced was of very limited use, and ISP compliance by 
employees could not be successfully achieved. This was demonstrated by the occurrence of a 
system failure soon after the ISA training programme was complete, which was caused by the 
introduction of a virus imported via a memory stick brought into the organisation by a 
member of staff. When interviewed, it was discovered that she knew nothing about computer 
viruses and the potential consequences of virus attack. As part of our research, we also 
interviewed a number of medical staff that had attended the ISA training, and they told us that 







Following the 2009 government inspection, at the end of 2011 Dynasty Hospital reorganised 
their ISA training programme. The emergence of system failures caused by user misuse and 
the increasing number of incidents exposing patients’ medical information alerted the hospital 
tothe importance of ISA and led them to re-examine the relevant regulative pressures. The 
hospital took an acquiescence strategy to relevant regulations, national standards and national 
policy, choosing to work with security professionals from external organisations to greater 
understand the usefulness of the regulative requirements. Consequently, a new training 
programme was designed and implemented based on the ISA training and education 
requirements and the guidelines of State Council Decree No. 27 issued in September 2003 - 
Regulations on Strengthen Information Security Protection, the National Informatisation 
Strategy 2006-2020, and national standards GB 17859-1999 and GB/T 20269-2006.  
 
 
5.4. The Implementation of Information Security Techniques 
 
By 2007, Dynasty Hospital had installed anti-virus software and a firewall on its computer 
hardware, and had installed air-conditioning and digital locks to enhance the safety of its 
computer facilities. At the end of 2008, with breaches in information security becoming 
increasingly prevalent in China, the organisation decided to institute further measures to meet 
emerging security challenges and more rigorous government inspections. According to the 
Chief Information System Officer of Dynasty Hospital, along with an interviewee from a 
company involved in the hospital’s ISM system implementation; the selection of the 
information security mechanisms represented an acquiescence strategy employed in response 
to the legal requirements for information security protection. Hospital management believed 






information security protection required and how this could best be achieved. Dynasty 
Hospital drew upon Decree No. 147, which stipulates the information security standard that 
organisations should achieve, and Decree No. 51 (Computer Virus Protection Measures for 
the Administration), which was issued by the Ministry of Public Security on April 26th, 2000, 
and which stipulates that every organisation should implement anti-virus protection measures, 
and use authorised security products and services. As seen previously, Dynasty Hospital once 
again adopted an acquiescence strategy to the mandatory information security standards in 
relation to information security implementation, including GB/T 20270-2006 on network 
systems, GB/T 20281-2006 on firewalls, GB/T 20273-2006 on database management systems, 
and GB/T 20272-2006 on operating systems.   
 
5.5. Monitoring, Evaluation and Improvement  
 
The monitoring, evaluation and improvement of ISM aims to track ISM operations in an 
organisation, evaluate its effectiveness in meeting the planned organisational goals and 
objectives in relation to information security, and to improve where appropriate previous 
activities in order to achieve better results in the future (ISO/IEC, 2005). The Chinese 
National Informatisation Strategy 2003-2010 placed a requirement upon organisations to 
conduct such ISM monitoring, evaluation and improvement, but Dynasty Hospital adopted a 
defiance strategy to it. According to the Director of the Information Centre, for a long time 
the hospital did not have any mechanisms for monitoring information security, in part due to 
a lack of awareness of its importance, while at the same time, the government requirements 







This situation changed when the hospital was given notice of a government inspection, due to 
take place in 2009. Decree No. 136 set clear criteria for the inspection of healthcare 
information, requiring all hospitals to have in place security monitoring systems, well-
established evaluation processes, and relevant procedures to institute any necessary 
improvements. Set against the backdrop of a growing number of breaches in information 
security in China, Dynasty Hospital acknowledged that the regular monitoring and evaluation 
of its information security was a necessity, and at this point the hospital switched to an 
acquiescence strategy in response to the regulative pressures on information security, 
monitoring and evaluation. As a consequence, the hospital President agreed to invest in 
security monitoring systems, and in September 2008, the Hospital Information Steering 
Committee initiated three-month checks, half-year checks and annual check on the 
performance of the hospital’s network security, information integrity and availability, user 
behaviour and server security; culminating in a thorough examination of the security 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the hospital’s information systems at the end of that year. 
The evaluation was largely guided by the Ministry of Healthcare Decree No. 66, and the 
Chinese Computer Information Systems Security Protection Classification Standards (GB 
17859-1999). As evidence of its improvement, by mid 2010, Dynasty Hospital had 
formalised its ISA training methods, using the National Informatisation Strategy 2006-2020 
as its guidance; and by the end of 2011, a new version of the ISP was released, which 
provided greater detail about the security procedures and security requirements of the 
organisation, in accordance with Decree No. 27 and Decree No. 147. According to some 
doctors and nurses, Dynasty Hospital has increased its efforts in tackling information security 
threats, although as the Chief Information Systems Officer remarked: “ISM improvement 










6. Discussion: Organisational Responses to Regulative Pressures 
 
6.1. Organisational Incentives, Regulative Enforcement and Organisational 
Conformity 
 
Our case study adds to the limited existing literature that seeks to explain organisational 
conformity with regulative pressures from the perspective of internal incentives (Ma, Schmidt 
and Pearson, 2009), or external enforcement (Hechter, Opp and Wippler, 1990). An 
organisation’s awareness of the importance of particular regulative pressures on its ISM is an 
important factor in selecting an appropriate response strategy. The more useful a regulative 
pressure is deemed to be to the protection of information security of an organisation, the 
higher conformity strategy the organisation will adopt. As observed in this research, Dynasty 
Hospital had relatively high awareness of the role of technical solutions in its protection of its 
information security, and therefore adopted high conformity with the regulations and policies 
that required the introduction of technical solutions. For example, in the implementation stage, 
Dynasty Hospital adopted an acquiescence strategy to Decree No. 51, which required the 
establishment of anti-virus measures, GB/T 20270-2006 on the standard of network systems, 
GB/T 20281-2006 on firewall standards, GB/T 20273-2006 on database management 
techniques, and GB/T 20272-2006 on operating systems techniques. In contrast, at the 
beginning of the ISM process, the hospital chose a defiance strategy in response to some 






which required public organisations to devise an information security strategy and set goals 
for information security protection. At this point, these requirements did not align with the 
existing plans of Dynasty Hospital, which gave information security strategy and goals a low 
priority. Similarly, at the policy making stage, Dynasty Hospital took a defiance strategy to 
national security standard GB 17859-1999, which it believed did not offer specific enough 
guidance on ISP making. However, the hospital adopted an acquiescence strategy to 
standards GB 4943-1995 and GB 9361-88, which were useful for the hospital when designing 
its policy on physical security. In relation to ISA training, Dynasty Hospital first selected an 
avoidance strategy, believing that the regulations requiring ISA were of no interest to the 
organisation, as they failed to offer specifications in relation to how to organise the necessary 
training. Similarly, at the beginning of the security monitoring and evaluation stage, the 
government’s regulative requirements were regarded as unhelpful and thus a defiance 
strategy was implemented. Interestingly, in both these phases of the ISM process, the hospital 
later adopted an acquiescence strategy, in response to a breach in information security caused 
by user misuse; at a time when such incidents were becoming increasingly common in China. 
Widespread concern about lapses in information security alerted Dynasty Hospital to the 
importance of regulative requirements on ISA training and information security monitoring 
and evaluation, and precipitated this change in strategic response.  
 
It is clear that there is a positive relationship between the strength of government enforcement 
of regulations and the level of conformity from organisations. In China, the government not 
only enacts the policies, laws and regulations that guide social actors’ behaviours, but also 
acts as a legitimate coercion institution. Government actors may intervene directly in 
organisational responses to regulations and exert supervision enforced by penalties in the 






subject to regular inspections and subsequent assessments by the government on the progress 
of their informatisation initiatives. In the case of Dynasty Hospital, government supervision 
moderates organisational decisions on the strategies adopted in response to regulative 
pressures. For example, in the stages of information security strategy formation and the 
setting of goals; and security monitoring and evaluation, Dynasty Hospital switched from a 
defiance strategy to an acquiescence strategy in response to relevant regulative requirements 
when the organisation’s management knew that a poor government inspection result would be 
followed by the imposition of sanctions. This study has found that whilst government 
supervision is likely to compel organisations to comply with laws, regulations and policies, 
weak legal enforcement without involving an associated penalty or potential for a loss of 




6.2. A Framework to Determine the Organisational Strategies Employed in Response 
to Regulative Pressures  
 
As discussed above, awareness by organisations regarding the importance of relevant 
legislation to its information security protection impacts upon organisational conformity. The 
selection of a response strategy is likely impacted upon by the strength of legal enforcement 
employed by the government. By considering both the existing literature and the empirical 
insights offered by this research on the impact of organisational incentives and regulative 
enforcement on organisational conformity with regulative requirements, it is possible to 
develop a theoretical framework that categorises the organisational response strategies to 








Figure 2: A Framework to Determine the Organisational Strategies Employed in Response to 
Regulative Pressures 
 
The weakest conformity emanates from regulative pressures (government orders and legal 
documents) that are perceived as unhelpful by an organisation, and when the associated legal 
enforcement is interpreted as weak; and leads to the adoption of defiance and manipulation 
strategies. In the Dynasty Hospital case study example, national security standard GB 17859-
1999 was considered too vague and complex for organisational ISP making, and there was no 
arrangement of government inspection on its adoption, and consequently Dynasty Hospital 





























When there are low internal incentives and high external enforcement, the avoidance strategy 
at the moderate level of conformity tends to be adopted. For example, Decree No. 136 issued 
by the local healthcare authority required Dynasty Hospital to follow relevant national 
policies and standards to organise ISA training, and also established a timetable for field 
inspections. Despite this regulatory demand, the hospital believed this statutory guidance to 
be unhelpful and instead adopted an avoidance strategy. Viewed through the lens of Oliver 
(1991) and considering the findings of Modell (2001), the hospital tried to disguise 
nonconformity; offering some training courses but failing to meet the content required by the 
authority.  
 
When there are high internal incentives and low external enforcement, an organisation tends 
to adopt a compromise strategy that offers a moderate level of conformity. For example, in 
China the government enacted laws and regulations on organisational ISP but did not include 
any enforcement measures, and in designing its ISP in accordance with its ISM priority, the 
hospital selectively adopted the government requirements that they believed useful for 
guiding their ISM.  
 
The highest conformity strategy of acquiescence will occur when an organisation clearly 
recognises the role of institutional pressure in helping it improve its ISM, and when there is 
strong legal enforcement in place. For example, in relation to its ISA training, Dynasty 
Hospital eventually abandoned the avoidance strategy and adopted an acquiescence strategy 
instead, as the result of a serious system failure caused by a staff member using a memory 
stick. This episode caused hospital management to realise that efficient training was vital in 
educating its employees about the importance of complying with ISP in their daily work 






the future. In another example, the hospital adopted an acquiescence strategy when 
responding to the requirements outlined in Decree No. 136 regarding devising an information 
security strategy, as the hospital were aware that such a strategy played an important role in 




6.3. Generalising Beyond the Case of Dynasty Hospital 
 
Generalizability or external validity has long been a cause for concern amongst case study 
researchers. Whilst single case research design is generally accepted, and has many 
precedents (e.g. Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), it is sometimes criticised for its lack of 
generalisation potential. This paper has focused on theoretical development in the form of a 
combined framework and provides an illustration of the concept from an empirical case 
offering rich insight. We follow the guidance of Klein and Myers (1999) and Yin (2008) on 
the generalisation of case studies, where longitudinal case study design coupled with 
appropriate theory offers theoretical generalisation, allowing researchers to track cause and 
effect effectively (Tsang, 2014). 
 
Referring to what Yin (2008) calls analytic generalisation in case study, Seddon and 
Scheepers (2012) have developed a generalisation-justification logic for justifying the support 
for generalisations from a single study, and have used this logic to analyse the MIS Quarterly 
best paper of Markus et al. (2006) in terms of the generalizability of their findings. Analytic 
generalisation is essentially theoretical generalisation (Tsang, 2014), and means arguing a 






(broader) settings; asserting that broad claims based on the sample are also likely to hold true 
in those other settings. Following this logic, and its application in evaluating the case study of 
Markus et al. (2006), we can justify the generalizability of our case study findings in two 
steps. Firstly, based on careful analysis of the case of Dynasty Hospital, we have developed a 
theoretical framework (provided at Figure 2). Secondly, because the internal and external 
forces that impact upon the behaviour of the case organisation are also likely to exist in other 
settings, we argue that our findings are also likely to be applicable in those other settings. 
Specifically, we believe that in one country, organisational ISM is relevant to every 
functional part of an organisation (ISO/IEC, 2005). In ISM, a failure to comply with 
government regulations is a global phenomenon across industries, whether in the USA in 
healthcare sector (Green, 2015), or in e-business in the UK (Mawani, 2011). We would argue 
that the elements provided in our framework are common to many different kinds of 
organisations in different country contexts, and as a consequence assert that the findings we 
have gathered from the Chinese case as represented by the framework in Figure 2 are 
generalizable to other organisational, industrial and country contexts. 
 
However, as Tsang (2014) has pointed out, the generalizability of case study results can only 
be assessed by observing future cases and by applying the developed theory in order to 
understand patterns of behaviour. “In any case, it is ultimately an empirical question” 
(Markus et al., 2006, p. 462) whether findings of a case study may be generalizable in broader 
contexts. We therefore encourage future research on this question in order to robustly test our 
proposed framework beyond our case study hospital within the healthcare sector, particularly 








7.  Conclusions 
 
Drawing upon the institutional theory concepts of institutional pressures and organisational 
responses, and based upon the five stages of the ISM process, this paper offers a case study of 
ISM in one public hospital in China. A theoretical framework is developed, which argues that 
the organisational strategic response to regulative requirements on ISM are determined jointly 
by an internal self-awareness of the organisation regarding the importance of particular 
regulative forces, along with the internal incentive of the organisation to comply with such 
forces; and the external law enforcement employed by government through supervision and 
inspection. Specifically, the more useful an organisation feels a regulative pressure to be to its 
information security protection, and the stronger the government enforcement on this 
regulative pressure is likely to be, the more compliant are the strategies the organisation will 
adopt; which range from a high to a low level of conformity and which include acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation.  
 
Important practical implications can be drawn from this research. In order to effectively 
promote organisational ISM, the government must ensure that the relevant statutory 
documents and associated policy guidance are useful for organisations seeking to protect their 
information security, and thus provide an incentive to comply. At the same time, the 
government should also consider the importance of enacting strict enforcement measures 
(such as supervision and inspections) to ensure that the laws relating to organisational ISM 
are respected in practice. Legal enforcement on behalf of governments is particularly 
important in developing countries such as China, where the legal infrastructure is relatively 






al., 2011). We would suggest that these countries attach penalties and sanctions to the most 
important regulative requirements in order to ensure increased compliance. 
 
Our work offers a number of opportunities for future research into ISM. This case study deals 
with a public healthcare organisation, the Dynasty Hospital, in China, where conformity 
strategies dominate the ISM process, and no evidence of selecting a manipulation strategy 
was observed. Like the case study hospital, organisations under close governmental control 
are unlikely to challenge and manipulate regulative pressures (Gao, 2005), whilst in 
professional organisations like the Dynasty Hospital, information systems and ISM often 
receive little attention from senior management. Future research could employ our framework 
to analyse organisations within other industries and in different countries. By considering 
cases subject to different levels of government intervention, and with various levels of 
information security awareness, future research may generate broader findings regarding 
organisational responses to regulative pressures, with internal incentives and external law 
enforcement as the moderating factors. For example, the patterns of organisational response 
in different stages of the ISM process; and the correlation of particular regulative forces, such 
as law, regulation and national policy, along with different strategies of organisational 
response, could all be considered.  
 
There are a number of limitations to our research. We have only considered self-awareness as 
the internal determinant of organisational strategy in response to government requirements. 
Further research may cover other internal factors, such as organisational structure, 
governance or business characteristics. Moreover, whilst our case study is based on 






Further research could consider normative and culture-cognitive pressures, which may also 
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